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1. Introduction
Consider a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. There will probably be
many actions that the agent can take to further the principal’s project. Some of these
actions will be observable, some not. In the following, we will subsume all actions that
are observable under the term observable effort, and all actions that are not observ-
able under the term unobservable effort. In the first-best, without moral hazard, the
optimalmix of efforts will in general include amix of both kinds of effort. The contract
that is usually assumed in situations of moral hazard is conditional on the observed
outcome only. In this paper we will look at a contract that is also conditional on the
level of observable effort. This means that the contract will stipulate a specific level
of observable effort and the principal will only pay if he observes at least this level of
observable effort.
Our main interest in this paper is the level of the contractually specified observable ef-
fort and its relation to the induced level of unobservable effort. We assume that there
is no direct interaction between the costs or returns of the two kinds of effort; never-
theless, the limited liability of the agent will influence the levels of both kinds of effort.
Moral hazard problems with limited liability of the agent usually have the following
outcome: if the principal cannot extract the whole surplus at the first-best level of ef-
fort, he will lower the implemented effort below the first-best level.1 In contrast, in our
model the specified level of observable effort will be above the first-best level, while
unobservable effort will be below the first-best level. This also means that the combi-
nationof observable and unobservable effort will not be cost-minimizing, i.e. the given
amount of total effort is produced with toomuch observable effort and too little unob-
servable effort. In other words, the agent would be able to produce the same level of
total effort with lower costs.
For an application, think about a situation where the principal wants the agent to un-
dertake a project that can fail with catastrophic consequences. Consider a government
that licenses a firm to operate an hazardous technology, like a chemical factory or a
nuclear reactor. The government wants the firm to undertake effort that increases the
probability that the firm operates safely. Some of this effort, like the compliance with
technical regulations for the construction of the plant, or the education level of the
operating personnel can be controlled rather easily. But other elements essential to
safe operation will be very hard to observe, like the workload and alertness of the per-
sonnel or whether the firm’smanagement exerts pressure on them to “bend the rules”.
The “regulatory contract” in such situations usually includes both standards for ob-
1This may or may not imply a rent for the agent.
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servable effort (“regulation”) and monetary payments that depend on the outcome of
the project (“fines” and “liability”). The compliance with the standards can and will be
enforced ex-ante, while the ex-post payments give the firm incentives to undertakeun-
observable effort. A similar problem exists if a big firm subcontracts part of a project
to a small firm. If the small firm produces bad quality, the damage for the big firm
might be immense. Contractual arrangements in such situations will usually not only
include payments that are conditional on final outcomes but will also authorise the
big firm to monitor whether the work of the small firm is in compliance with contrac-
tual standards. In addition, the big firmmight demand that the small firmwill have its
operations “certified” by a third party.
Our results suggest that in such situations the principal will set standards that demand
observable effort which is above the first-best level, while the level of unobservable ef-
fort will be below the first-best. For example, the work of a small subcontractor will
be more oriented toward observable effort compared to the case where the big firm
would do the work itself. To generalize, we suggest a possible inefficiency existing un-
der moral hazard with limited liability, which does not lie in the amount of total effort
but in the way this effort is produced. This inefficiency has seen scant attention in
theory but is often complained about in practice.
Many employees of big organizations complain about “bureaucracy”. They feel that
their work is inefficiently organized – it would be more productive if there were fewer
regulations to observe and more time could be spend on doing “real work”. Regula-
tory regimes for hazardous activities are criticized for putting too much emphasis on
compliance with technical standards rather than on soft factors like “safety culture”.
And many observers question whether a firm’s decision to seek certification for use of
a “quality management systems” is mainly motivated by customer pressure, while the
real effect on quality is questionable.2
This work is related to a number of papers which all exploit a similar effect: if the solu-
tion to the moral hazard problem calls for granting the agent a rent, the principal will
try to expropriate this rent by forcing the agent to undertake some other activity that
benefits the principal. This activity might be socially inefficient, but because its costs
come out of the agent’s rent, it is still advantageous for the principal to implement
it. The activity in question might be another principal-agent project (Laux, 2001), re-
porting activities like “paperwork” (Strausz, 2006) or the effort in a preceding period
2The question whether firms introducing ISO 9000 quality management systems are mainly moti-
vated by external reasons (customer pressure etc.) or by internal reasons (concern for quality and cost
improvements) has been the subject of numerous studies, which have come to conflicting results. An
overview of previous studies can be found inHeras Saizarbitoria et al. (2006); the Delphi study described
in their paper finds that external reasons are dominating. In a similar vein, Buttle (1997) describes a sur-
vey of ISO 9000 certified firms; the highest scoring motivation for certification is “anticipated demand
from future customers for ISO 9000”.
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of the principal-agent relationship (Kräkel and Schöttner, 2010). Our model is the first
that applies this effect to the choice between observable effort and unobservable ef-
fort. This setting is not only of great practical importance, it does also allow for a sharp
characterizationof the trade-off that is responsible for the implementationof a socially
inefficient activity.
In the “Law & Economics” literature, Bhole andWagner (2008) analyze a setting where
a firm can take observable effort as well as unobservable effort to prevent an accident.3
They find that in many situations only the combined use of both liability and regula-
tion will lead to optimal levels of effort in both dimensions. There are two important
differences to our approach. First, in a tort law setting the principal has a different
objective function (total welfare) and usually a restricted choice of policy measures.
Second, Bhole andWagner only consider a binary choice of observable effort; because
in their model a high level of observable effort is first-best, the question of excessive
regulation of observable effort is ruled out by assumption.
Multi-dimensional effort has been studied in number of other settings in the litera-
ture. In the most prominent treatment by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), different
dimensions of effort interact through the agent’s cost function. In our model, there
is no such interaction; observable effort and unobservable effort influence each other
only because of the shared limited liability constraint.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2. sets up themodel. In section 3.,
we discuss a benchmark case, namely a contract that is conditional on outcome only.
Themain part of the paper is section 4., which analyzes a contract that does also regu-
late the agents effort, while section 5. concludes. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2. Setup of the Model
There are two kinds of effort, observable effort o ∈ [0,omax] and unobservable effort u ∈
[0,umax] with omax,umax > 0 and omax+umax ≤ 1. The agent’s project has two outcomes,
it can either succeed or fail, s ∈ {0,1}. The probability of success (s = 1) depends on the
agents effort and is given by p(o,u)= o+u. At times we will denote this probability as
total effort. If the agent exerts effort, he suffers costs of co(o)+ cu(u). Note that under
this setup there is no direct interaction between the two kinds of effort: the level of
one kind of effort does not influence the marginal cost or the marginal return of the
3In an article on liability for nuclear accidents, Trebilcock and Winter (1997) sketch a tort-law model
with observable and unobservable effort but do not fully solve it.
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other kind of effort.4 We further need the following technical assumptions for the cost
functions:
Assumption 1. co(o) and cu(u) are continuous, three times differentiable, strictly in-
creasing and strictly convex.
Assumption 2. co(omax)= cu(umax)=∞.
Assumption 3. c ′o(0)= c
′
u(0)= 0.
Assumption 4. c ′′′o (o),c
′′′
u (u)> 0.
Assumption 5. co(0)= cu(0)= 0.
Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that the agent’s problem has an interior solution, while
Assumption 4 makes the principal’s problem concave (the condition on c ′′′o (o) is only
needed for the benchmark case).
The benefit for the principal if the project succeeds is set to B > 0. Both parties are
risk neutral. To induce effort, the principal will write a contract that specifies a transfer
scheme t (s,o) that can depend on the outcome of the project and the observed effort.
The agent faces a liability limit L ≥ 0, which can either be interpreted as the maxi-
mum fine that can be imposed on the agent ex-post, or the maximum bond that can
be posted by the agent ex-ante.5 This liability limit is expressed by:
Assumption 6. t (s,o)≥−L ∀s ∈ {0,1},o ∈ [0,omax].
We have to distinguish two concepts. On the one hand, we have the socially optimal
first-best effort levels o∗ and u∗, which are given by c ′o(o
∗)= B and c ′u(u
∗)= B . On the
other hand, for a given level of total effort p, we can find the least expensive combi-
nation of observable and unobservable effort that produces p. Such a cost-minimizing
combination of efforts will be characterized by c ′o(o)= c
′
u(u).
6 It is easy to see that first-
best effort levels are also a cost-minimizing combination of efforts, but that there are
also many other cost-minimizing combinations of efforts that are not first-best.
4In reality those direct interactionwill often exist, making the two kinds of efforts either complements
or substitutes. In this paper, we assume no direct interaction to isolate those effects that are due to
limited liability.
5We assume that the liability limit does not depend on the level of efforts.
6This condition results from min
o,u
co(o)+cu(u), subject to p(o,u) = p. Formally, the marginal rate of
technical substitution between these two kinds of effortmust be equal to the ratio of respectivemarginal
costs.
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3. Benchmark Case: Incentives only
To establish a benchmark case, we will first consider a contract that conditions only on
outcome. This contract can be described by the transfer scheme:
t (s,o)=
{
b+w if s = 1
w if s = 0
It has the usual property that the principal sets a base wagew and a bonus b. It follows
that the profit function of the principal is given by Π(o,u,b,w) = (B −b) ·p(o,u)−w ,
while the payoff function of the agent is V (o,u,b,w)= bp(o,u)+w−co(o)−cu(u). The
principal has to solve the problem:
max
o,u,b,w
Π(o,u,b,w)
subject to:
V (o,u,b,w)≥ 0 PC
w ≥−L, w +b ≥−L LLCs
(o,u) ∈ argmax
(o,u)
V (o,u,b,w) IC
(1)
The fact that u is unobservable does not necessarilymean that the first-best will not be
implemented. In fact, if the principal sets b = B , the agent will deliver effort levels o∗
andu∗. Thewagew∗ that extracts all the agent’s surplus is then givenbyV (o∗,u∗,B ,w∗)=
0, which can be written as w∗ = co(o∗)−cu(u∗)−Bp(o∗,u∗).
But this extraction of surplus is feasible only if w∗ ≥ −L; in this case, the principal
can “sell the project” to the agent. If w∗ < −L, the principal faces a tradeoff between
incentivizing effort and extracting rent. In the following, we will always assume that
the first-best will not be implemented, namely
Assumption 7. w∗ <−L.
We will find the optimal effort levels obm and ubm by using the so-called first-order
approach. The following proposition shows that this approach is valid in our setting
because the agent’s optimal choice of effort levels is at a stationary point.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution to (1) has b > 0 and obm,ubm will be given by the
agent’s first-order order conditions b−c ′o(o)= 0 and b−c
′
u(u)= 0, with obm ∈ (0,omax), ubm ∈
(0,umax) and total effort p(o,u)> 0.
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We can therefore replace the incentive constraint with the agent’s first-order condi-
tions. Additionally, because b > 0, one of the limited liability constraints,w+b ≥−L, is
superfluous. The Lagrangian for the principal’s problem can now be written as:
L (o,u,b,w,λ,η,µo ,µu)=
(B −b) ·p(o,u)−w +λ
(
b ·p(o,u)+w −co (o)−cu(u)
)
+η (w +L)+µo
(
b−c ′o(o)
)
+µu
(
b−c ′u(u)
) (2)
In the optimal solution, the limited liability constraint w ≥−L will always be binding,
while the participation constraint may be binding or not.
Proposition 2. The optimal solution to (2) has w =−L and
b =B −
(1−λ)p(o,u)
1
c′′o (o)
+
1
c′′u (u)
(3)
with 0≤λ< 1. If the agent will get a rent, we have λ= 0.
The optimal contract can be found be trying out two cases. In the first case with λ= 0,
the optimal effort levels are given by the trade-off between the costs of incentives and
the principal’s benefit from havingmore effort, ignoring the PC (this will usually mean
a rent for the agent). But if those effort levels andw =−L do not satisfy the PC, we have
the case λ> 0. The principal sets w =−L and chooses the unique level of b that makes
the PC binding. This will mean higher effort levels than in the first case and no rent for
the agent.7
In both cases we will have c ′o(obm) = c
′
u(ubm) = b < B . This implies that both kinds of
effort are below the first-best level (obm < o∗ and ubm < u∗ ), but because c ′o(obm) =
c ′u(ubm), they form a cost-minimizing combination.
4. Joint Use of Incentives and Standards
We now look at a contract that makes the principal’s payments conditional not only
on outcome, but also on observable effort. At first glance the problem of finding the
optimal contract looks quite simple: set the observable effort to o∗ and optimize over
u (because we assume p(o,u) = o +u, there is no interaction between the two kinds
of effort). But it will turn out that the optimal contract will have a level of observable
effort that is above o∗.
7Which case obtains depends on the severity of the liability limit. Define L∗ by V (o∗,u∗,B,−L∗)= 0
and L˜ by V (obm,ubm,B,−L˜) = 0 (where obm and ubm are given by (3) with λ = 0). If 0 ≤ L < L˜ the agent
gets a rent, if L˜ ≤ L < L∗ there will be no rent.
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We consider contracts of the following form:8
t (s,o)=


b+w if s = 1 and o ≥ o
w if s = 0 and o ≥ o
−L if o < o
where o is contractually specified level of observable care. The principal’s expected
profit is given by
Πo(o,u,b,w)=
{
(B −b) ·p(o,u)−w if o ≥ o
B ·p(o,u)+L if o < o
while the agent’s payoff has the form:
Vo(o,u,b,w)=
{
bp(o,u)+w −co(o)−cu(u) if o ≥ o
−L−co(o)−cu(u) if o < o
The principal’s problem is given by:
max
o,u,b,w,o
Πo(o,u,b,w)
subject to:
Vo(o,u,b,w)≥ 0 PC
w ≥−L, w +b ≥−L LLCs
(o,u) ∈ argmax
(o,u)
Vo(o,u,b,w) IC
(4)
Denote by oˆ and uˆ the effort levels that are implemented in the optimum. The first
problem is again to show that the first-order approach is valid here.
Proposition 3. The optimal solution to (4) has oˆ = o and b > 0. Effort level uˆ will
be given by the agent’s first-order order condition b− c ′u(u) = 0, with oˆ ∈ (0,omax), uˆ ∈
(0,umax) and total effort p(oˆ, uˆ)> 0.
Wecan again use the agent’s first order condition foruand ignore the constraintw+b≥
0. The Lagrangian for the principal’s problem can be written as:
L (o,u,b,w,λ,η,µ)=
(B −b) ·p(o,u)−w +λ
(
b ·p(o,u)+w −co (o)−cu(u)
)
+η (w +L) + µ
(
b−c ′u(u)
) (5)
8The principal cannot improve his profit by using amore general contract that distinguishes between
more levels of o, because, besides his effort level, the agent has no other private information.
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Proposition4. In the optimal solution to (5), both the participation constraintVo(o,u,b,w)≥
0 and the limited liability constraint w ≥−L are binding. The optimal effort levels oˆ and
uˆ are given by
c ′o(o)=B +
1−λ
λ
(B −c ′u(u)) (6)
and c ′u(u)=B − (1−λ) ·p(o,u) ·c
′′
u (u) (7)
with 0<λ< 1.
It is quite intuitive that the principal will not give the agent a rent. Suppose the princi-
pal would choose some o and some b < B so that the agent gets a rent. The principal
could then increase observable effort and get a marginal benefit of B −b while letting
the agent take the additional costs out of his rent. So the principal will transform the
agent’s rent into his own benefit.
From (6) and (7) and 0 < λ < 1 we can conclude that c ′u(u) < B and c
′
o(o) > B . This
implies that oˆ > o∗ and uˆ < u∗, so observable effort is above and unobservable effort is
below the first-best level. We also note that oˆ and uˆ are not a cost-minimizing combi-
nation of efforts (because c ′o(oˆ) 6= c
′
u(uˆ)), meaning that p(oˆ, uˆ) could be produced less
costly by a different combination of efforts. It is also clear that oˆ > obm, but we cannot
tell whether uˆ is greater or smaller than ubm. In fact, numerical simulations show that
both cases can occur.
The principal is willing to set observable effort above the first-best level because stipu-
latingmore observable effort has the additional benefit of inducingmore unobservable
effort. When the principal demands additional observable effort, hemust compensate
the agent for the additional cost (because the PC is binding), but does so by increasing
b, thereby increasing the agent’s incentive for providing unobservable effort. This can
bee seen if we combine the two implicit equations (6) and (7) by eliminating λ:
c ′o(o)−B = (B −b) ·
1
c ′′u(u)
·
1
p(o,u)
(c ′o(o)−b) (8)
Equation (8) can interpreted as the trade-off facing the principal at the margin when
he increases oˆ beyond o∗. The term on the left-hand-side is the principal’s cost of in-
creasing observable effort further above the first-best level. Because the PC is binding,
he has to compensate the agent for the marginal cost of additional effort but receives
additional expected benefit of only B (which is smaller than c ′o(o) because oˆ > o
∗). The
right hand side is his marginal benefit and can be interpreted as follows (read from
right to left): if o is increased, the agent has marginal costs of c ′o(o) but receives a
marginal increase in expected payoff of only b. To compensate the agent for a small
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loss in payoff, the principal has tomarginally increase b by 1
p(o,u) . Anmarginal increase
in b will increase unobservable effort by 1
c′′u (u)
, while a marginal increase in u will give
the principal an marginal benefit of B −b. These effects can be labeled as follows:
c ′o(o)−B︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
dΠ
do
= (B −b)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dΠ
du
·
1
c ′′u(u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
du
db
·
1
p(o,u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
db
dV
(c ′o(o)−b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
dV
do
In our model, the agent’s limited liability causes a combination of the two kinds of ef-
fort that is not cost-minimizing, namely too much observable and too little unobserv-
able effort. This suggests that a decrease in L – the problemof limited liability becomes
worse – will increase this distortion. The next proposition shows that this is indeed the
case.
Proposition 5. If L decreases (the agent’s liability becomes more limited), oˆ increases
and uˆ decreases.
This result looksmore obvious than it is. Because if L decreases, it changes not only the
optimal combination of o and u that implements a given level of p(o,u) (substitution
effect), but it may also change the level of p(o,u) that is optimal for the principal to
implement (scale effect).9 Proposition 5 shows that the first effect dominates. This
result also suggests a possible way to test our theory: for agents with a stricter liability
limit we should observe standards that prescribe a higher level of observable effort.
5. Conclusion
The paper analyzes a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent where
the agent’s effort has one observable and one unobservable dimension. For simplicity,
we only consider the casewhere the two kinds of efforts do not interact with each other.
We consider different contracts with regard to two questions: whether each of the two
kinds of effort is above or below its first-best level and whether the two levels form a
cost-minimizing combination. With a contract that is conditional on outcome only,
both kinds of effort are below their first-best levels but they form a cost-minimizing
combination. With a contract that is conditional on both outcome and observable
effort, unobservable effort will still be below its first best level while observable effort
9The terminology is taken fromNagatani (1978). It can be shown that if L decreases, the substitution
effect is positive for o and negative for u. But if the optimal p(o,u) decreases, the scale effect will be
negative for both kinds of effort.
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will be above the first-best level. This combination of efforts will not be cost-minimiz-
ing. The distortion between the two kinds of efforts increases if the agent’s liability
becomes more limited.
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Wefirst show that all b ≤ 0 give the principal the sameprofit. If the principals sets b ≤ 0,
the agent will always choose o = 0 and u = 0, and w = 0 will make the PC binding. This
will give the principal a profitΠ= 0, for all b ≤ 0. Thus to show that b ≤ 0 is not optimal
it is sufficient to show that b = 0 is not optimal
We now show that for a given b ≥ 0 and w , the maximum of V (o,u,b,w) = bp(o,u)+
w − co(o)− cu(u) will be characterized by the first-order conditions b− c ′o(o) = 0 and
b−c ′u(u)= 0. Because V (o,u,b,w) is strictly concave in o and u, an interiormaximum
will be characterized by the first-order conditions. As regards to corner solutions, o =
omax or u = umax cannot be a maximum because the costs would be infinite, so zero
effort would be better. A possible corner solution with o = 0 and u = 0 would have
b−c ′o(0)≤ 0. Because of b ≥ 0 and c
′
o(0)= 0 this implies b = 0 and thismaximumwould
also fulfill the first-order condition with equality.
Now we show that b = 0 cannot be an optimum. Suppose otherwise: then the agent
would choose o = 0 and u = 0, and w = 0 would make the PC binding. If the principal
would marginal increase b he would get:
dΠ
db
= −p(o,u)+ (B −b)
(
do
db
+
du
db
)
(9)
= B
(
1
c ′′o (o)
+
1
c ′′u(u)
)
> 0 (10)
where the values of do
db
and du
db
come from implicitly differentiating the agent’s first-
order conditions; at the same time, at this point, dV
db
= p(0,0)−c ′o(0)
do
db
−c ′u(0)
du
db
= 0 so
the PCwill still be satisfied. Because this implies obm,ubm > 0, wemust have p(o,u)> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
The first order conditions for a maximum are:
∂L
∂o
= (B −b)+λ(b−c ′o (o))−µoc
′′
o (o)= 0 (11)
∂L
∂u
= (B −b)+λ(b−c ′u(u))−µuc
′′
u(u)= 0 (12)
∂L
∂b
=−p(o,u)+λp(o,u)+µo +µu = 0 (13)
∂L
∂w
=−1+λ+η= 0 (14)
λ,η,µo ,µu ≥ 0 (with complementary slackness)
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It cannot be the case that both the PC and the LLC are slack. In this case, the principal
could always increase his profit by decreasing w (formally, equation (14) can never be
fulfilled). Furthermore, it cannot be the case that the PC is binding and the LLC is not
binding: Because this would imply η= 0, and from (14) we would get λ= 1. Then (13)
and complementary slackness give us µo = 0,µu = 0 and from this we get o = o∗ and
u = u∗ (using equations (11) and (12)). But this contradicts Assumption 7.
By using the agent’s first order conditions we can simplify the equations to
b+µoc
′′
o (o)=B
b+µuc
′′
u(u)=B
µo +µu = (1−λ)p(o,u)
with 0≤λ< 1. Solving this system of equations for b yields:
b =B −
(1−λ)p(o,u)
1
c′′o (o)
+
1
c′′u (u)
.
This implies b <B and µo , µu > 0.
For this solution to be amaximum,the Lagrange function evaluatedwith the Lagrange-
multipliers found abovemust be concave. This function is given by:
L
∗(o,u,b,w)=Bp(o,u)+ (1−λ)L−λ[co (o)+cu(u)]−µoc
′
o(o)−µuc
′
u(u)
which is concave in o, u, b and w (because c ′′′o (o),c
′′′
u (u)> 0).
Proof of Proposition 3
We first show that o = o by contradiction. Consider the case o < o. If the agent would
like to disobey the contract,his optimal choice of efforts is o= 0 andu = 0,whichwould
give him a payoff of −L < 0. But this cannot be optimal for the agent because obeying
and delivering o = o would give him a non-negative payoff (because the principal has
to fulfill the PC).
Now consider the case o > o. This would be optimal for the agent if the effort level
given by c ′o(o)= b is higher than o, or c
′
o(o)< b. To show the opposite first note that in
the principal’s optimum it must be the case that c ′o(o) ≥ B . If not, the principal could
marginally increase o while holding the agent’s payoff constant by increasing w . This
would increase the principal’s profit marginally by B − c ′o(o) > 0. Second, it cannot be
optimal for the principal to set b >B . Consider
dΠ
db
=−p(o,u)+ (B −b)
1
c ′′u(u)
which is negative for b > B . If the LLC is binding, this shows that decreasing b will
increase Π. If the LLC is not binding, the principal could extract the increase in the
agent’s surplus
dV
db
= p(o,u)+b
1
c ′′u(u)
−c ′u(u)
1
c ′′u(u)
= p(o,u)
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where the last equality results from using the agent’s first-order condition. So the prin-
cipal’s profitwould increase by dΠ
db
+
dV
db
= (B−b) 1
c′′u (u)
which is still negative for b >B . So
we have c ′o(o)≥B and B ≥ b which implies c
′
o(o)≥ b whichmeans that in the optimum
o will be greater than the effort level implied by c ′o(o)= b.
We next show that all b ≤ 0 give the principal the same profit. Suppose the principal
chooses some o ∈ [0,omax] and sets b ≤ 0. Then the agent will choose u = 0. For the PC
to hold the principal has to set w = −bo+ co(o) > 0 ≥ −L. This will give him the same
profitΠ=Bo−co(o) for all b ≤ 0.
The proof that for all b ≥ 0 the optimal u will be given by the agent’s first-order condi-
tion b− c ′u(u)= 0 is analogous to the argument in the proof of Proposition 1. Because
oˆ > o∗ > 0 we will also have p(o,u)> 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
The first order conditions for a maximum are:
∂L
∂o
= (B −b)+λ
(
b−c ′o(o)
)
= 0 (15)
∂L
∂u
= (B −b)+λ
(
b−c ′u(u)
)
−µc ′′u(u)= 0 (16)
∂L
∂b
=−p(o,u)+λp(o,u)+µ= 0 (17)
∂L
∂w
=−1+λ+η= 0 (18)
λ,η,µ≥ 0 (with complementary slackness)
We show that a solution to these conditions must have both the PC and the LLC bind-
ing. If the PC is not binding, we will have λ = 0. Then (15) gives us b = B . But from
(17) we get µ = p(o,u) and plugging into (16) gives us b = B −p(o,u)c ′′u(u) < B , a con-
tradiction. If only the PC is binding but the LLC is not, we will have η= 0. From (18) we
get λ= 1 and from (17) we get µ= 0. Plugging into (15) and (16) gives us c ′o(o)= B and
c ′u(u) = B respectively. This implies, that the first best can be achieved with a bonus
contract without violating the LLC. But this contradicts Assumption 7.
From (18) we get λ= 1−η and with λ,η> 0, we must have 0< λ< 1. From (17) we get
µ= (1−λ)p(o,u)> 0. Substituting for µ into (16) and rearranging gives us
c ′u(u)= b =B − (1−λ) ·p(o,u) ·c
′′
u (u)<B
and substituting b = c ′u(u) into (15) gives us:
c ′o(o)=B +
1−λ
λ
(B −c ′u(u))>B.
For this solution to be amaximum,the Lagrange function evaluatedwith the Lagrange-
multipliers found abovemust be concave. This function is given by:
L
∗(o,u,b,w)=Bp(o,u)+ (1−λ)L−λ[co (o)+cu(u)]−µc
′
u(u)
which is concave in o, u, b and w (because c ′′′u (u)> 0).
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Proof of Proposition 5
We have to show that do
dL
< 0 and du
dL
> 0. The optimal values for o,u,b and w are given
by the solution to the four equations:
b ·p(o,u)+w −co (o)−cu(u)= 0 (19)
L+w = 0 (20)
b−c ′u = 0 (21)
(c ′o −B)c
′′
u ·p(o,u)+ (b−B)(c
′
o −b)= 0 (22)
where (22) is a rewritten form of (8). If we differentiate these four equationwith respect
to L, we get:
p(o,u)
db
dL
+1 ·
dw
dL
+ (b−c ′o)
do
dL
+ (b−c ′u)
du
dL
= 0 (23)
1+
dw
dL
= 0 (24)
db
dL
−c ′′u
du
dL
= 0 (25)
((c ′o −b)+ (B −b))
db
dL
+ (c ′′oc
′′
up(o,u)+ (c
′
o −B)c
′′
u + (b−B)c
′′
o )
do
dL
+((c ′o −B)c
′′′
u p(o,u)+ (c
′
o −B)c
′′
u)
du
dL
= 0
(26)
We can now solve (24) for dw
dL
= −1 and (25) for db
dL
= c ′′u
du
dL
. Plugging these results into
(23) and using (21) gives us
p(o,u)c ′′u
du
dL
+ (b−c ′o)
do
dL
= 1 (27)
while plugging the results into (26) gives us:
(c ′′o c
′′
up(o,u)+ (c
′
o −B)c
′′
u + (b−B)c
′′
o )
do
dL
+((c ′o −B)c
′′′
u p(o,u)+2(c
′
o −b)c
′′
u)
du
dL
= 0
(28)
To simplify calculations, we make the following substitutions:
e = b−c ′o
f = p(o,u)c ′′u
g = [c ′′o c
′′
up(o,u)+ (c
′
o −B)c
′′
u + (b−B)c
′′
o ]
h = [(c ′o −B)c
′′′
u p(o,u)+2(c
′
o −b)c
′′
u]
The two equations can then be written as[
e f
g h
]
·
[ do
dL
du
dL
]
=
[
1
0
]
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Using Cramer’s Rule we can solve for
do
dL
=
h
eh− f g
and
du
dL
=
−g
eh− f g
.
Because at the optimum c ′o > B > b, we will have e < 0, f > 0 and h > 0. To sign g , we
rewrite (22) and get
B −b
c ′′up(o,u)
=
c ′o −B
c ′o −b
< 1
where the inequality follows again from c ′o > B > b. Because c
′′
up(o,u)> 0, this implies
c ′′up(o,u) > B −b. Now we can easily show g > 0. These results imply eh− f g < 0 and
finally do
dL
< 0, du
dL
> 0.
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